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An Overview of Economics and Regulation
1. Introduction
An important connection exists between economic research and
regulation, in particular in fields of the law important to the economy,
such as regulation of companies, taxation and contractual relations.
This has been recognised and elaborated by the law and economics
movement. The connection is, however, not entirely straightforward,
regardless of whether it is seen from an economic or a legal
perspective. Problems concern such things as how economic research
might be applied in a regulatory context and in law finding or what
legal knowledge is necessary for robust economic research on the
impact of regulation.
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In this conference paperour aim is to discuss problems concerning
the connection between economics and regulation, and how they can
be handled, briefly.As a stepping stone we address some principal
questions of how economic research might be applied. Thereafter we
turn to regulatory methods and models, in part directing the discussion
to regulation as such, in part to regulatory techniques, and how they
influence law finding. We conclude with a brief discussion on
problems which might be associated with application of economic
research in a regulatory context.
2. Economic theory, empirical research and regulation
For long legal scholars have appreciated the economics might
affect law and that it often is desirable with insights in economics for
regulators. As early as 1843 it is stated in the Swedish legal periodical
JuridisktArkif (‘Legal Archives’):
‘Before we turn to a closer examination of the concepts and
contents of economic law, we would like to draw attention to, that
political economics as the basis for all economic law must be
studied.’1
During the last decades the literature of different schools of law
and economics has literally exploded. The impact of law and
economics research has also given rise to a both scholarly and
practical discussion of problems of regulation influenced by economic
research. This discussion is in part of great methodological value, in
part misinformed. It could, even if that might be over the top, be put
that while it seemed to have been natural for lawyers in the 19th and
early 20th century to take economic research into account, this is today
more controversial. The legal scepticism should probably be referred
to both a lack of tradition and a lack of methods to evaluate the ever-
increasing research in economics. It might also reflect that economics
is but one tool among several which might be prayed in aid then
regulating.
Now, how could economic research beof use in the regulatory
process?2Although this obviously might differ depending on the
societal, economic, and political context, some general observations
might be fruitful. Generally it would not be considered controversial
to use economic empirical research or economic theory descriptively;
that is to describe potential effects of regulation. It might be added
                     
1Schmidts Juridiskt Arkif 1831, 99 at p. 137 et seq.
2Cf. Stattin, Företagsstyrning. En studie av aktiebolagsrättens regler om ägar- och
koncernstyrning, 2 ed., Uppsala, 2008, chapter 2.
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that, in fact, it could be more accepted to use theory as opposed to
empirical results as long as empirical research is not conclusive. If this
approach is criticised it probably would depend on for instance how
the research have been carried out, whether it is robust or whether its
methodology is open to critique.
A well known and often cited example of economic research
which have both contributed to the understanding of the economic
impact of law and can be criticised from a legal point of view, is the
research in ‘law and finance’ carried out by American economist and
Nobel Foundation Professor La Porta and his associates.1This law and
finance approach can be characterised as ‘jurimetric’ in as much as it
calculate the function of law — for instance the level of shareholder
protection — by reference to numeric criteria. While the law and
finance research has contributed to the understanding of law and
finance, it is easy to question, for instance due to:
The perception of comparative law. The Law and finance approach
often has a focus on rules whereas comparative law focuses on the
function of law.
Focus on legal systems. It is highly doubtful whether it is at all
fruitful to focus on the origin of legal systems as law always have
been influenced by different jurisdictions.
Choice of criteria. If certain legal rules are compared, it is easy to
miss other rules that might affect the results.
Number of criteria. Few criteria make the results blunter, whereas
too many criteria might make it to complex.
Level of complexity. In most jurimetric research the results are
measured at a given time and on a short scale, such as none or one
point. For a more true result the legal development should be
measured and a more diverse scale should be applied.
Lack of contextual understanding. The impact of legal culture is
often missing.
Bias. It seems that jurimetric research often is biased towards the
jurisdiction of the researcher.
What has been said is not an attempt to reduce the value of La
Porta’s research specifically, or law and finance research generally;
rather our intention is to illustrate that interdisciplinary research is
difficult and requires careful thought when it comes to methodology.
                     
1La Porta, López-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny), Law and Finance, Journal of Political
Economy, December 1998. Reprinted in J. Schwalbach ed., Corporate Governance; Essays in
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Close to, but not the same as, descriptive application of economic
theory or empirical research is normative use of economics, namely
use of economic research results in a legal-political argument de
legeferenda(on what the law ought to be). Generally, this is accepted.
It should be noted, however, that economic research results are not the
only reasons to regulate that is valid in a legal-political context.
It is more doubtful whether economic theory or empirical research
might be of use in deciding singular cases or controversies, for
instance in the courts, in order to motivate construction or application
of valid law — firstly methodological problems exist, secondly it is
difficult within an economic model to pay due consideration to the
particularities of singular cases.This goes back to the fundamental
differences between law and economics as scholarly disciplines.
While the law in aimed at providing methods to solve singular cases,
economics has a structural approach to research. It is only natural that
it is less fruitful to try to apply a structural approach when deciding
singular cases.1
3. Regulatory perspectives
It is now time to say something on regulatory perspectives, in other
words how regulatory activities should be perceived.Two variants of
regulatory perspectives should be considered: the regulation of
particular issues on the basis of economic theory or empirical
research, and the regulation of a whole field of law in order to achieve
(among other things) economic aims.
An example of the former is the regulation of corporate
representation in article 9 of the first European company law
directive. The directive does not have a thought through approach to
economic problems that might arise when its rules are applied.
However, the rules on corporate representation have. In the
travauxperparataire it seems clear that the said rules are aimed at
abolishing the ultra vires doctrine, which worked to the detriment of
both companies and their contractual parties, thus minimising
transaction costs and increasing efficiency.
An example of the later is the companies legislation in for instance
the United Kingdom or most Scandinavian countries. The UK
Department of Trade and Industry stated the aims of the reform
leading to the UK Companies Act of 2006 as follows:
‘[support] the creation, growth and competitiveness of British
companies and partnerships,
                     
1CfCheffins infra.
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[promote] an internationally competitive framework for business,
so that UK continues to be an attractive place to do business,
[provide] straightforward, cost-effective and fair regulation which
balances the interest of business with those of shareholders, creditors
and others,
[promote] consistency, predictability and transparency and
underpins high standards of company behaviour and corporate
governance.’1
The legislative intent behind the UK Company Law Reform is
expressed in economic terms. The economic nature of the legislative
intent opens the law to economic arguments, both in the regulatory
process and in construction of the rules after their promulgation.
Professor Brian Cheffins, Cambridge University, puts it
‘Since conventional legal discourse is unlikely to be adequate,
academics seeking to evaluate the DTI’s current efforts at reform
should make explicit use of theory. By taking into account how
business enterprises operate and by assessing the impact which legal
rules are having on existing patterns of behaviour, it should be
possible to gain a sense of whether a legislative regime is placing
undue restrictions on beneficial corporate activity or is exposing
various constituencies affiliated with companies to excessive risks. As
we have seen, interdisciplinary methodology can be used to gain a
sense of how legal rules affect corporate activity.’ Theoretical analysis
therefore should provide academics with the means required to
evaluate current and proposed legislation in accordance with the terms
set down in the DTI’s 1998 discussion paper.’2
Professor Cheffins is concerned with academic evaluation of law.
We submit that the same applies to those who try to find the law in a
singular case, as long as economic thought is akin to the legislative
intent.
4. Economic models and regulatory models
So far it we have shown that it is relatively accepted to let
economic theory or empirical research influence regulation. We will
now turn to how this might be achieved in practice.
Most common, but probably least useful, is what can be
characterised as spontaneous economic reasoning in the regulatory
process — the discussion of effects of regulation present in
                     
1DTI directive, Company Law Reform, pp. 6 och 14.
2Cheffins, Using Theory to study Law: A Company Law Perspective, 58 CLJ 197 (1999) at
p. 218.
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travaeuxpreparataireof European Union legislative acts is often of
this character: from more or less empirically decided starting points,
how the proposed regulation might affect the economy, small
businesses, or something else is discussed. Even if it might be fruitful
to discuss the effects of regulation in economic terms, such a
discussion of a slightly more ambitious — for instance using scientific
methods — nature would sometimes be even more useful.
A second way to use economics is to apply more or less explicit
law and economics methods. Most well known are probably classical
law and economics approaches, such as elaborated by the so called
Chicago school of law and economics with prominent members such
as professor and judge Richard Posner.1Classical law and economics
is sometimes complimented or substituted with theory from other
economic or social science research fields, for instance a growing
literature in behavioural law and economics2 have influenced at least
the academic debate on regulation. Behavioural law and economics
need not be looked upon as an alternative to classical law and
economics, but as a further approach to evaluating the regulation.
Typically, it would more easily for regulators, or lawyers in general,
to appreciate behavioural law and economics as this school of
economic thought are more akin to traditional legal thought on the
regulation as offering remedies or providing rules on a case by case
basis.
In this context it might be useful to point out that it is one thing to
make theoretically coherent arguments on how regulation ought to be
shaped, and a totally different thing to really show that economic
effects occur. To draw empirical conclusions from economic facts is
however not a tasksuitable for lawyers, as they are not trained in
empirical research.
From this two conclusions can be drawn: Firstly that regulation in
most cases, at least when it deals with economic conditions, will have
a higher quality when lawyers and economists cooperate. Secondly as
it is difficult to draw conclusions from empirical research and
different researchers often end up with different results, regulators
will more often than not lack conclusive evidence on economic
effects. Lack of empirical results should however not entail that
economic research is not considered in a regulatory process — still
economic theory might be of use in evaluating probable effects of
                     
1 Most well known work is An Economic Analysis of Law, 7 ed. 2007.
2 Cf. Sunstein, Law and Economics: A Progress Report, American Law and Economics
Review, Vol. 1, No. 1, pp. 115-157, 1999.
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regulation. Especially if economic theory coincides with practical
experience, it is a strong argument for what the law ought to be. An
example of this might be incentives to corporate managers which have
proven extremely difficult to justify empirically, but seems to work
from bot a theoretical and a practical perspective.
A closely connected question is whether economic theory can shed
any light on what regulatory models should be applied.1 In general
three variants of regulatory models are used, often within the same
legislation, namely mandatory rules, opt out rules and opt in rules.
From economic theory it might be concluded that, simply put,
mandatory rules should apply when those protected by the legislation
does not have a legal locus standi, or in other words a real possibility
to influence the outcome of negotiations or decision-making. A
typical example would be creditor protection rules in company law.
Opt out and opt in rules should apply within the meaning of the
standard contractual effect of legislation, for instance when the
legislation provides solutions from which the parties to a transaction
may deviate. A typical example is company law rules aimed at
protecting shareholders, which in most legal systems might be broken
with the consent of wronged shareholders — such rules, for instance
requirements to have a statutory audit in UK law, might instead be
negotiated away by the shareholders if they do not see the need for
such rules.By negotiate away certain rules which have been provided
in the legislation (as a standard contract) the shareholders are using an
opportunity to opt out. If, instead, the shareholders create new rules in
the articles of associations they are opting in such rules.
A combination of mandatory rules, optout rules and opt in rules
have been utilised in the UK Companies Act 2006, thereby creating a
flexible regulation for British companies. As the law provides rules
that most shareholders and other parties would demand with an optout
possibility and rules that will not be of need often with an opt in
possibility, the transaction costs for drafting rules or trying to
circumvent the law should be significantly lower.
5. Brief concluding remarks
To very briefly conclude: We could summarise the contents of this
essay with stating that economic theory and empirical research is a
valuable tool in regulation. It might be difficult to apply or to
comprehend the implications of economic research in a regulatory
                     
1 This is discussed in an European (mostly British) context by Cheffins in Company Law:
Theory, Structure and Operation, 1997.
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context, but it would at least be fruitful in the long run to develop
coherent methods to do this.
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О МЕТОДОЛОГИИ В ПОЛИТИЧЕСКОЙ ЭКОНОМИИ
И ЭКОНОМИЧЕСКОМ АНАЛИЗЕ
АННОТАЦИЯ. В статье рассматриваются проблемы взаимосвязи
методологии в политической экономии и экономическом анализе.
Аргументируется, что основная посылка современного экономи-
ческого анализа о нейтральности «технических» приемов иссле-
дования, вытекает на самом деле из той или иной философско-
методологической позиции автора. Обращается внимание на
особенности политико-экономического анализа в отечественной
народнической школе, которая не отрицала связи экономической
науки с политикой и идеологией.
КЛЮЧЕВЫЕ СЛОВА: политическая экономия, методология, исто-
рия экономического анализа, народническая экономическая мысль
АНОТАЦІЯ. В статті розглядаються проблеми взаємозв’язку ме-
тодології в політичній економії і економічному аналізі. Аргументу-
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